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for attachment for contempt. If the right to the fine existing in
the shape of a judgment, is a vested private right in the party to
whom it was to be paid, the court had no right to discharge it:
In re Mullee, 7 Blatch. 23.
The proceeding for contempt is sometimes both civil and criminal. In South Carolina a sheriff was attached for contempt in
not paying over money, or neglecting to collect it on execution.
It was held to be a civil process, so far as its object was to redress
the party procuring it, but criminal, as being designed to punish
the sheriff for neglect of duty. Though the contempt would generally be purged, only when the injured party was put in as good a
position as if the sheriff had done his duty, the court held that he
might be discharged on purging himself of contempt and showing
inability to pay the money: Ex parte Thurmond, I Bailey 605.
The enforcement of civil rights and remedies, by means of proceeding for contempt, is forbidden by the statutes of Arkansas.
CHARLES CHAUNCEY.

(To be continued.)
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SIMU v. ANGLO-AMERICAN TELEGRAPH COMPANY.
ANGLO-AMERICAN TELEGRAPH COMPANY v. SPURtING.
A transferee of stock in a company does not acquire a right thereto by estoppel,
as between him and the company, by the mere fact of registration of the transfer
and the issue of the certificate. Nor is the company under any duty towards him
to make any inquiry of the transferor before issuing the certificate.
B. & Co. purchased upon the stock exchange 50001. stock in the defendant company. A transfer of the stock purporting to be executed by C., the true owner,
was lodged with the company by S. & Co., the nominees of B. & Co. The company, after sending the usual notice to C., registered S. & Co. as holders. B. &
Co., then, to secure advances, obtained a transfer of the stock to the plaintiffs,
who were in like manner registered as owners, the certificate being issued to them
by the company. The advances being paid off, the plaintiffs continued to hold the
stock as trustees for B. & Co. It was afterwards discovered that the transfer from
C. was a forgery, and the company thereupon replaced C. upon the register, and
refused to pay dividends to the plaintiffs or to acknowledge their title to the stock.
Held (reversing the judgment of LiNDLEY, J.), that B. & Co. being the real
plaintiffs, the defendants were not estopped from denying the validity of the transfer to S. & Co.
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THIS was an appeal from a judgment of LINDLEY, J., given at

the trial, without a jury, at Guildhall. The action was brought
under the following circumstances.
In November 1876, a Mr. Coates was the registered owner of
50001. stock of the defendant company. Phillips, a confidential
clerk of Coates, having obtained possession of the stock certificate,
instructed one Thompson, a jobber on the stock exchange, to sell
the stock in question, which was eventually purchased by Burge &
Co., who, being desirous of raising a loan from Spurling & Skinner, passed the name of the latter firm as buyers of the stock, it
being intended that the stock should be given as security for the
loan. Phillips thereupon forged a transfer of the stock from
Coates to Spurling & Skinner.
On the 2d of December, Spurling & Skinner, at the request of
Burge & Co., left the transfer and the stock certificate at the office
of the defendant company for registration. On the same day the
company wrote to Mr. Coates as follows: "I beg to inform you
that a transfer purporting to be signed by you, transferring stock
in this company as follows, viz., 50001. to Percival Spurling and
another, has been lodged at this office, and if I do not hear from
you by return, I shall assume the same to be correct. (Signed),
John Grant, secretary."
No reply being received, the company on the 6th of December,
duly registered the transfer. Before the time for delivering out
the certificate arrived, however, viz., on the 9th of December, a
transfer of the stock in question from Spurling & Skinner to Simm
& Ingelow (who were trustees of the National Bank), was lodged
with the company by Burge & Co., they having obtained a transfer
from Spurling & Skinner for a nominal consideration. Thereupon
the usual course was followed, and a notice in similar terms was
sent by the company to Spurling & Skinner. No answer being
received, the registration in the names of Simm & Ingelow followed,
and the certificate was delivered out to them. Burge & Co. had
deposited the stock with the National Bank by way of security for
advances received by them. The company treated Simm & Ingelow as owners of the stock, and paid to them the dividends due
upon the same up to the end of the year 1877. Burge & Co. having repaid to the National Bank the sums advanced upon the
security of the stock, it remained standing in the names of Simm
& Ingelow, but they had no beneficial interest in it, being bare
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trustees for Burge & Co. The forgery having been discovered, the
company refused to pay the dividend due in February 1878, to
Simm & Ingelow, replaced Coates upon the register, and refused to acknowledge the title of Simm & Ingelow to the stock.
Thereupon this action was brought in the names of Simm & Ingelow for damages for wrongfully representing Spurling & Skinner
to be the registered holders of the stock, and for the sum of 50001.

alleged to be the purchase-money of the stock, and also for the
amount of dividends due. And the company brought a cross-action
against Spurling & Skinner for breach of warranty with respect to
the forged transfer.
With the consent of all parties Burge & Co. were added as
plaintiffs in the first action and as defendants in the second action,
it being admitted that they were the real parties intended, and
that Simm & Ingelow and Spurling & Skinner were only the nominees.
LJINDLEY, J., directed judgment against the company in both
actions, and the company now appealed.

Watkin Williams, Q. C., H. Davey, Q. C., and Findlay, for
the company.
Benjamin, Q. C., and Bush Cooper, for Simm & Ingelow.
Day, Q. C., and Channel, for Spurling & Skinner.
The following authorities were cited in the arguments: In re
Bahia and San Francisco Railroad Co., L. R., 3 Q. B. 584;
Hart v. Frontino Company, L. R., 5 Ex. 111; Knights v. Wiffen,
L. R., 5 Q. B. 660.
L. J.-I have come to the conclusion that this judgment cannot be supported, and that it should be entered for the
company. The real plaintiffs are Burge & Co., Simm & Ingelow,
though inserted as plaintiffs. on the record, having no interest in
the matter, being bare trustees for them. The case, therefore, must
be dealt with as if Burge & Co. were the sole plaintiffs. Now
Burge & Co. can have no greater right against the Telegraph Company than they would have if they were claiming under the forged
transfer which purported to be direct from Coates, for the fact that
Burge & Co. procured Spurling & Skinner to become the transBRAMWELL,
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ferces, and to be registered as holders of the stock, and that
Spurling & Skinner then transferred to Simm & Ingelow, whose
names were then put upon the register, can give Burge & Co.
no greater right than if these steps had not been taken. We
may treat the case, therefore, as if Burge & Co. had taken the
forged transfer. Would they then have had the right they now
claim, viz., that the defendants should be estopped from denying
their title?
The effect of estoppel is that the person said to be estopped is
compelled to act upon the assumption of the existence of a state
of facts which does not in truth exist. If the defendants here are
estopped from denying the plaintiff's title, they cannot deny the
existence of those facts which are necessary to make Simm &
Ingelow holders of the stock, and these are, that the persons who
transferred to them must have been holders of the stock, and have
transferred that stock to the plaintiffs, and that the company must
have accepted the plaintiffs as transferees. Now, there is no doubt
that the plaintiffs were accepted as transferees by the company,
and the company do not pretend the contrary, also that the company are estopped from denying that Coates was a holder; but
what is there to make them estopped from denying that he executed
a transfer? The plaintiffs take an instrument to the defendants
which purports to be a transfer from Coates to them, and upon
that they ask the defendants to put them upon the register as
holders of the stock. This the defendants do, but why on this
account should they be estopped ? All they have done is to accept
the invitation of Burge & Co. to put them on the register. It
seems to me more reasonable to say that Burge & Co. would be
estopped.
Now, Mr. Benjamin contended that it was the duty of the
defendants to make inquiries, and that by putting the plaintiffs on
the register and giving them the certificate, they affirm that the
transfer is correct. I entirely dissent from that proposition. This
system of companies making inquiries before putting the names of
purchasers of stock on the register is comparatively modern, and
is a very reasonable one, but it is for their own benefit only.; for
as between themselves and the transferees of Burge & Co. the
company, having given Burge & Co. a certificate, would be estopped
from denying their title to the stock, and therefore for their own
protection they ought to make inquiry; but I do not see why
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because they do so they should be precluded in this action from
saying that the transfer presented by Burge & Co. was a forgery.
The three cases referred to in the argument in which the estoppel
did arise are all distinguishable from the present case. In Kvights
v. Wiffen, the defendant had in effect said to the plaintiff. "I
hold the quarters of barley separate from the rest and at your disposal," and the Queen's Bench held that he was estopped from
denying that the property in the goods had passed to the plaintiff.
In that case the plaintiff had not made any statement to the defendant such as Burge & Co. have made here. In the Bahia case the
transferee had acted on the faith of certificates given to a prior
holder, and the company having given these certificates, and intending them to be acted upon, were held to be bound by them on the
principle of Pickard v. Sears, 6 Ad. & E. 469. In Hart v.
Prontino Company there was no incorrect representation of fact
made by the plaintiff. He had got a bona fide transfer from a person who was on the register of the company as shareholder. He
took this instrument to the company and requested them to accept
him as shareholder. This they did, and it was held that they were
afterwards estopped from denying his title to the shares. There
was in that instance no conduct on the part of the plaintiff that
induced the company to act as they did. I am not sure, in giving
judgmaent in that case, I fully appreciated the effect of the certificates given by the company.
In my opinion it is unnecessary to consider in this case whether
any damage has occurred to the plaintiffs. Even if it could be
shown that Burge & Co. have suffered damage in consequence of
what the company have done, it would not, I think, make any difference. It would be their misfortune.
am also of opinion that this appeal must be
to
consider whether the judgment of Mr. Jusallowed. We have
tice LINDLEY can be supported upon the grounds he stated or upon
any other grounds.
N'ow, I do not think it can be supported on the grounds stated
by him, which were, that when Burge & Co., as transferees of stock
from Coates, mortgaged their stock to Simm & Ingelow as trustees for the bank, they were in possession of certificates from the
company which asserted that they were the holders of the stock so
mortgaged, and that therefore, as between themsehes and Simm
& Ingelow or the bank, the company were estopped from denying
BRETT, L. J.-I
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the title of Burge & Co. to the stock. Now, it cannot be doubted,
on the authority of the Bahia case, the giving of this certificate
did raise this estoppel between Simm & Ingelow and the company,
and Mr Justice LINDLEY held that therefore this gave Simm &
Ingelow a legal right by estoppel to the stock, and that because
they, being mortgagees with a legal title, became, when the Mortgage was paid off, trustees for Burge & Co., Burge & Co. could rest
upon the same title that Simm & Ingelow had, and that therefore
the company were also estopped as against them. But in this I
think he was wrong. The true interpretation of the phrase "legal
title by estoppel" is, that the estoppel is equally recognised at law
and in equity. But the estoppel gives no right to the subjectmatter; it merely assumes that the real state of facts is the contrary of that which the other party is estopped from denying. I
do not speak of estoppel by deed, which I take to be a phrase in
reference to the interpretation of the deed, but I speak of such
estoppels as arise out of the ordinary transactions of daily life:
these have no effect on the reality of existing facts. For instance,
suppose a person in possession of certain goods to be in such a
position as to be estopped from denying that he is under a contract
to deliver those goods although there is no such contraot; he may
be bound in an action to act as if there were such a contract, and
to deliver up the goods. But suppose the goods are not really in
his possession, and that he is estopped from denying the contract,
and also the fact that the goods are in his possession. Then in the
action for the delivery of the goods he could not be made to deliver
them, but to pay damages. So the estoppel has no effect on the
reality of the facts, but merely gives a cause of action. Thus, in
this case there was an estoppel against the company for a time in
favor of Simm & Ingelow, which was raised by their having
given certificates that Burge & Co. were owners of the stock, upon
the faith of which certificates Simm & Ingelow had acted. If
Simm & Ingelow could have shown that they had sustained any
damage by reason of their having so acted on the faith of these
certificates, they could have maintained an action against the company, in which the company would have been estopped from denying the truth of the certificates, but when once the mortgage was
paid off there was no damage, and from that time no right of action
by reason of the estoppel. The only persons who could have maintained the action were Simm & Ingelow. They had no legal title.

SiMM v. ANGLO-AMERICAN TEL. CO.

but a right of action only, therefore, when they could no longer
maintain the action they could not transfer the right, so that Burge
& Co. cannot maintain the action on this ground.
Nor can they do so on other grounds. Burge & Co. are the real
plaintiffs, and there can be no estoppel in their favor against the
defendants : first, because there was no representation to the effect
relied on made by the defendants to Burge & Co.; and next,
because even if such representation had been made, no alteration
in the position of Burge & Co. was caused by It. Burge & Co.
acted on the belief that they had bought the stock through a broker
on the stock exchange, and received a transfer which they supposed
came from Coates, and they with it received a certificate, issued by
the company, that Coates was the holder of the stock; they thereupon applied to the company to place them on the register; the
company acted in the usual manner, and wrote a letter to Coates,
and, upon receiving no reply, put the names on the register, and
issued a certificate, and it is the issuing of this certificate which is
the act relied upon to raise the estoppel. It is alleged that the
representation relied upon arises out of the issuing of the certificate
and the facts I have stated, not out of anything that the company
have stated. Now, in the first instance, Burge & Co. trusted
entirely to the broker, who, I think, is liable to them as upon a
contract for an undisclosed principal. It was upon the faith of the
transfer, which he must be taken to have represented to have come
from Coates, that Burge & Co. paid the price of the stock; there
was nothing in that to raise an estoppel against the defendants.
After they had paid the purchase-money, Burge & Co. induced the
company to put the names on the register.
Now it is a practice of companies before registering to make
inquiry of the transferor, but they are not bound to do this on
behalf of the transferee, they do it for their own benefit; and
indeed if the transferee does not put credit in the broker he can
himself make inquiry of the transferor. All the facts which
caused Burge & Co. to be put upon the register and entitled them
to a certificate are as much known to them as to the defendants,
and some of them are more within their knowledge than the company's. They know, for instance, what the contract with the
broker was, and it is quite as much their duty to make inquiries as
it is the company's. All the company do is to put the names on
the register, which act of the transferor, if valid, makes Burge &
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Co. holders of the stock, but the company do this on the statement
of Burge & Co. The certificate is merely a statement that the
company have accepted Burge & Co. as holders, but does not allege
any fact known to the company and not known to Burge & Co.
The only use of it is for the purpose of making a transfer, or to
show the title to the stock. The issuing of it, therefore, does raise
an estoppel against the company as between them and a subsequent
purchaser, as it is given with the intent that he may act upon it,
and is a representation by the company of facts not within his
knowledge.
There is, then, no representation made by the defendants to
Burge & Co. sufficient to raise the estoppel, and I doubt whether
Burge & Co. have made any representation which might estop them
as against the company. Even if the company had made such a
representation to Burge & Co., they would not be estopped, because
the legal position of Burge & Co. has not been altered by it.
If they ever had a remedy against the broker at law they have
it still; and I think any remedies they may have had under the
rules of the stock exchange they have still. It has been said that
they have been put to rest, and prevented from pursuing any
remedy they had, but this is not enough, unless they have been
damaged. I can understand that such delay, if it caused damage,
would make a difference; for example, if the broker had in the
meantime stopped payment, according to .Knights v. TViffen, 1
think they might recover, and I do not disagree with the decision
in that case; but that case does not affect the present, as here the
plaintiffs have suffered no damage. I think this a very important
case, and have therefore given my judgment at some length. I
express no opinion upon the second action.
think this judgment cannot be supported.
COTTON, L. J.-I
The action arose in this manner: The plaintiffs claim to be entitled
to be treated as holders of stock, and the company denies their
right. Now, on these facts alone, independent of estoppel, the
plaintiffs have no right of action, because the transfer to them was
a forged one, and they were not owners of the stock at all, which
still remains vested in Coates.
Now, as to estoppel, the question is whether or no the plaintiffs
have any right, and we may treat the case as if Burge & Co. were
the only plaintiffs.
I object to the phrase, title by estoppel, and, prefer to call it
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right by estoppel, which is this, that when A. makes a statement
to B., and B. acts upon the faith of that statement, and that statement is suh that if it represented an existing state of facts, B.
would have a right of action against A., in such an action A. is
estopped from denying that the facts are as he has represented, and
must be treated as admitting the truth of his statement. It is
under this doctrine that Burge & Co. claim to be entitled to bring
this action against the company. The two cases referred to, the
Bahia case and Hart v. The Frontino Co., are different from
the present. Here Burge & Co., or some one on their behalf, took
to the defendants a document purporting to be a transfer from
Coates, but in reality a forged one; the company gave a certificate
to the holder, and the question is whether the giving of this certificate is such a representation by the company as to estop them
from denying it as against Burge & Co. In the Bahia case the
plaintiffs were not in the position of Burge & Co., but of a purchaser from the nominee of Burge & Co., who had paid money on
the faith of the certificate. Now that was a representation by the
company that the transferor was the owner of the shares, and the
company was held to be estopped as against the subsequent purchaser from saying he was not. In the present case, Burge & Co.
say that Coates was the holder, and that the company having
registered the alleged transfer from him and given the certificate,
are estopped from denying the truth of the transfer.
But Burge & Co. have an equal chance of knowing how the
transfer was effected, and the case really turns upon the question
whether, as was argued by Mr. Benjamin, the company were under
a duty towvards Burge & Co. to make inquiry before issuing the
certificate. The only duty arises from this is, that if the company
were to act on a forged transfer they would be liable, and that,
whether they made inquiry or not; but this is not a duty towards
the alleged transferee, it is a duty cast upon directors for the
sake of the company, and no duty towards the real holder of the
stock, who is alleged to transfer, because if the company act upon
a forged document they would be liable to him, and might be to
other persons. The company made no representation of any facts
to Burge & Co., and I say nothing, therefore, as to whether Burge
& Co. acted in faith of any such representation.
The main ground of the judgment of Mr. Justice LINDLEY, was
that Simm & Ingelow had a good title by estoppel, and that it
ntill remains.
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No doubt the company would be estopped as against them from
denying that Spurling & Skinner were holders of the stock, but
it seems to me there is some confusion when it is argued that this
amounted to a real title by estoppel in Simm & Ingelow, which
therefore passed from them to their cestui que trust.
Estoppel can only create a real title in a matter of transfel in
such a case as where a man who has a title grants a lease, and baving subsequently obtained a good title, he is estopped from denying the lease which then becomes a good title by estoppel; so in an
action for conversion of goods, on the ground that the property in
them had passed to the vendor of. the plaintiff, as in Knights v.
Wiffen, an admission by the defendant will be effected for the purpose of that act to pass the property in the goods. Here we are
dealing with stock that cannot be transferred except in one way,
and the company can give no title by any admission. All that can
be gained by estoppel, except by the owner, is a right of action
against the company, founded upon the truth of the fact stated by
the company, and in this way if Simm & Ingelow had produced
their certificate and sold in the market, the purchaser would have
had a right of estoppel against the company, not as purchaser from
Simm & Ingelow, but as having acted upon the statement made
by the company, which would have created a fresh right in him
against them. Burge & Co. knew all the facts, and are thrown
back upon their original title, and cannot indirectly get any right
by estoppel through Simm & Ingelow.
I give no opinion upon the question raised in the second action.
Appeal allowed. Judgment reversed in the first action, and to
stand in the second action.
The American cases fully settle the
general principle suggested in this case,
viz., that a corporation which has accepted and acted upon a forged transfer

of its shares, and issued a new certificate,
which a bonafide purchaser subsequently
buys, is liable to such purchaser, either
by way of estoppel or otherwise, for the
value of his shares. He buys upon the
faith of their certificate, not upon the
faith of the forged transfer ; and in such
cases he has as good a claim as one who
blvs directly ot a corporation, stock
whizh is fraudulently issued by its author-

ized officers; as was held in the wellknown Scbuyler frauds. Whereas it by
no means follows, that the party who
buys a forged transfer of shares, and
upon taking it to the corporation procures from it a new certificate to himself,
has any remedy against the corporation,
if the transfer afterwards proves illegal ;
the corporation cannot be estopped merely because it has issued a certificate to
This was the precise point inhim.
volved in our principal case, and was no
doubt correctly decided.
In all such cases the buyer takes his
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title, whatever it be, from the former
owner and vendor of the stock, and not
from the corporation ; the latter is only
the conduit or channel through which the
tide passes, and neither the company nor
the officers assume any responsibility for
See Hildyard v.
the vendor's title.
South Sea Co., 2 P. Wins. 76; Ward
v. Central Railroad Co., 37 Geo. 515.
But suppose a person had actually bargained for, or agreed to buy, the stock
upon the faith of a forged transfer, but
did not pay his money for it, until the
forger had procured a new certificate
from the corporation to himself, which he
delivers to the purchaser, who thereupon
pays for it; what then, has he any
remedy against the corporation or not?
One of the best considered of the
recent cases on this subject was that
of Ratt v. 31achinists' National Bank,
The plain123 lass. 110 (1877).
tiff there was the owner of shares in
the defendant corporation, the certificate
of which was stolen from her house, and
delivered by the thief, with a forged
transfer in blank thereon, in her name,
to Field & Co., brokers, for sale. They
employed Hawes & Henshaw, stock auctioneers, to sell the same by auction, and
they sold to one Dean. Field & Co. then
sent the plaintiff's certificate of stock,
with the forged transfer thereon filled up
to Hawes & Henshaw, and asking for a
new certificate to issue to them, which
was done by the company. Hawes &
Henshaw then sent back this new certificate to the company, with a transfer
thereon to said Dean, the purchaser at
auction, and the company issued to him
a new certificate of the shares, all parties, except the forger, acting in good
faith. The forgery being then discovered,
the plaintiff brought her bill in equity
against the -company, and also against
Dean, the purchaser, asking for a decree,
that Dean surrender his certificate to the
company and that they be ordered to
issue a new certificate for the shares and
pay her the intervening dividends, &c.,
VOL. XX'.-22

and upon the question whether the plaintiff was entitled to the relief prayed for
in her bill, the court, GaAY, C. J., said,
"It is quite clear the plaintiff could not
be deprived of her stock without her consent, or negligence on her part, and the
power of attorney in her name being
forged, she may maintain this bill to compel the corporation to issue a certificate
to her for her shares, and to pay the
dividends thereon: Ashby v. Blackwell,
2 Eden 299 ; s. c. Ambl. 503; Sloman
v. Bank of England, 14 Sim. 475; Midland Railway v. Taylor, 8 H. L. C.
751 ; Pollock v. National Bank, 3 Seld.
274; Sewall v. Boston Water-power Co.,
4 Allen 277."
But upon the other question raised by
the bill, whether the defendant Dean,
should be ordered to reconvey the shares,
or surrender his certificate, the court
took a different view, saying: "The
individual defendant was a purchaser in
good faith, for full consideration, without knowledge or notice of the plaintiff's
title, or of the forgery, and does not hold
the certificate which she had. The immediate transfer to him was made by
Hawes &Henshaw, who then held a new
certificate of stock ; and the corporation,
upon surrender of that certificate, issued
to him another one. His rights against
the corporation depend upon the effect
of this certificate; the plaintiff is clearly
entitled to no decree against him : Salisbury Mfills v. Townsend, 109 Mass. 115 ;
Lowry v. Commercial Bank, Taney 310;
Bank v. Lannier, 11 Wall. 369; In re
Bahia San Francisco Railway Co., L.
R., 3 Q. B. 584.
If he had claimed under a transfer
whichhe knew, or was bound to know,
to be forged, or invalid, a different case
would be presented: Cottam v. Eastern
CountiesRailway, 1 Johns. & Hem. 243;
Johnston v. Renton, L. R., 9 Eq. 181 ;
Tayler v. Great Indian Peninsula Railway, 4 DeG. & J. 559 ; Denny v. Lyon,
38 Penn. St. 98.
It had been contended at the argument
upon the authority of Ashby v. Blackwell,
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above cited, that the decree should order
the corporation to repay to the individual
defendant Dean, the sum that he had
paid for the stock, and lie be ordered to
surrender his certificate, so that the right
of the defendant to the stock could be
determined in this suit ; but the court said
that in Ashby v. Blackwell, all parties
submitted to the decision of the court as
the only question whether the purchaser
or the company should bear the loss;
"But when, as in this case, the relief
given to the plaintiff does not require or
involve the decision of any question between the co-defendants, the court does
not, and cannot, unless by consent, decide such a question, so as to bind the
co-defendants as against each other, but
leaves it to be settled in a proper suit
between them: Cottingham v. Shrewsbury, 3 Hare 627, 638; "/etcher v.
Green, 33 Beay. 426; Carlton v. Jackson, 121 Mass. 592, 597." The decree
was therefore entered for the plaintiff
against the corporation, and the bill
dismissed as to the individual defendant
Dean, but without prejudice to any question, at law or in equity, between the codefendants. The corporation then, apparently complied with this decree, and
issued a new certificate to the plaintiff
of her stock, leaving Dean the purchaser,
also the owner of the same number of
shares, whereby the capital stock was increased beyond the legal amount. The
company then brought a bill in equity
against Field & Co., Hawes & Henshaw
and Dean, praying that Hawes & Henshaw might he ordered to repay to Dean
the amount he bad paid them for the
stock, and that he might be ordered to
reconvey the stock to the corporation,
so that the corporation should not have
outstanding any more shares than allowed by law ; but the bill was dismissed for
want of jurisdiction, on the ground that
Dean could not be ordered to return his
certificate, because he purchased the
shares in good faith and for valuable ron-

sideration, and the certificate issued to
him is as against thc corporation conclusive evidence of his title. The corporation
has no right to compel him rather than
any other stockholder to give up his cer.
tificate, and thereby assume the responsibility of its own illegal act in issuing a
greater number of shares than the law
authorized. And as Dean was not bound
to surrender his certificate, he had no
claim to be repaid his money, either as
against Hawes & Henshaw, or Field &
Co.
Whether the corporation had any claim
against Field & Co., by reason of haying presented to them a forged power of
attorney upon which it had 'issued new
certificates, the court gave no opinion ;
but if they were liable to the corporation
in any form, an adequate remedy existed against them alone, by an action
at law: A/acldnists' National Bank v.
.Field 4. Others, 126 Mass. 345 (1879).
If the corporation had any remedy
against Field, it would seem to be upon
his implied warranty that the forged
transfer was genuine, as had been held
in other cases.
Upon the question involved in the first
case whether the defendant Dean, the
purchaser of the stock in good faith was
really liable to the plaintiff from whom
the stock had been obtained by forgery,
it was not thought necessary to decide
in that case, because the plaintiff had an
adequate and complete relief against the
corporation itself; but it seems that if
she had at first brought her bill against
Dean solely, Ile could have been compelled to have restored the stock to her,
as never having legally parted with it,
leaving him to his remedy over, if any,
against the corporation. This was the
course pursued in Weaver v. Barden, 3
Lans. 338, and 49 N. Y. 286; wlhile in
Monk v. Graham, 8 Mod. 9, even an action at law (trover), was maintained by
the rightful owner against a bona fide
purchaser under similar circnmstanees.
EDMuND H. BENETT.

